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Continuous Workout Mortgage (CWM) balance and payments are indexed using market-observable
house price index in an economic environment with prepayments. Our main results include: (a) explicit
modelling of repayment and interest-only CWMs; (b) closed form formulas for mortgage payment
and mortgage balance of a repayment CWM; (c) a closed form formula for the actuarially fair mortgage
rate of an interest-only CWM. For repayment CWMs we extend our analysis to include two negotiable
parameters: adjustable "workout proportion" and adjustable "workout threshold." These results are
of importance as they not only help in the understanding of the mechanics of CWMs and estimating
key contract parameters, but they also provide guidance on how to enhance the resilience of the financial
architecture and mitigate systemic risk.
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m.shackleton@lancaster.ac.ukThe ongoing crisis has exposed the vulnerability of the most sophisticated ﬁnancial
structures to systemic risk. This crisis—emanating from mortgage loans to borrowers
with high credit risk—has devastated the capital base of ﬁnancial intermediaries on both
sides of the Atlantic. Its impact on the real sector of the economy has given rise to a fear
anduncertaintynotseensincetheGreatDepressionofthe1930s(seeReinhartandRogoff,
(2008); and Diamond and Rajan, (2008)).
The fragility of the ﬁnancial intermediaries stems from the rigidity of the traditional
mortgage contracts such as the Fixed Rate Mortgages (FRMs), Adjustable Rate Mortgages
(ARMs) and their hybrids (see Stiglitz (1988); Campbell and Cocco (2003); Green and
Wachter (2005); and Reinhart and Rogoff (2008)). Modigliani (1974, p. 1) reiterates this
quite strongly when he states that: “As long as loan contracts are expressed in conventional
nominal terms, a high and variable rate of inﬂation — or more precisely a signiﬁcant degree of un-
certainty about the future of the price level — can play havoc with ﬁnancial markets and interfere
seriously with the efﬁcient allocation of the ﬂow of saving and the stock of capital.” This neces-
sitates reforming the ﬁnancial architecture with facilities that can better absorb shocks in
the ﬁnancial system in order to make it more resilient and mitigate systemic risk.
One such solution studied in this paper is that of Continuous Workout Mortgages
(CWMs) as expounded in Shiller (2008a), (2009b), (2008b) and Feldstein (2009). This fa-
cility eliminates the expensive workout of a defaulting rigid plain vanilla mortgage con-
tract. CWMs share the price risk of a home with the lender and thus provide automatic
adjustments for changes in home prices or incomes, for all home owners. Mortgage bal-
ances are thus adjusted and monthly payments are varied automatically with changing
home prices. This feature eliminates the incentive to rationally exercise the costly option
to default which, by construction, is embedded in every loan contract. Despite sharing
the underlying risk, the lender continues to receive an uninterrupted stream of monthly
payments. Moreover, this can occur without multiple and costly negotiations.
Unfortunately, prior to the current crisis CWMs have never been considered. The aca-
2demic literature (with the exception of Ambrose and Buttimer (2010), i.e., A&B hereafter)
therefore has not discussed its mechanics and especially its design. Shiller is the ﬁrst
researcher, who forcefully articulates the exigency of its employment as stated above.
CWMs are conceived in his (2008b) and (2009b) studies1 as an extension of the well-
known Price-Level Adjusted Mortgages (PLAMs), where the mortgage contract adjusts
to a narrow index of local home prices instead of a broad index of consumer prices. In
a recent study Ambrose and Buttimer (2010) numerically investigate properties of Ad-
justable Balance Mortgages which bear many similarities to CWMs. Our simple and fully
analytic model complements that of a more intricate one of Ambrose and Buttimer (2010).
We rely on methodology which allows to value optional continuous ﬂows (see e.g. Carr,
Lipton and Madan (2000) and Shackleton & Wojakowski (2007)).
For lenders to hedge risks, continuous workout mortgages thus need indicators and
markets for home prices and incomes. These markets and instruments already exist.2 For
example, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) offers options and futures on single-
family home prices. An example of this are the Real Estate MacroShares launched on
NYSE in May 2009. Furthermore, reduction of moral hazard incentives require inclusion
of home-price index of the neighborhood into the monthly payment formula. This is to
prevent moral hazard stemming from an individual failing to maintain or damaging the
property just to reduce mortgage payments. Likewise, occupational income indicators
matter along with the borrower’s actual income. This is again to prevent moral hazard
stemming from an individual deliberately losing a job just to reduce mortgage payments.
We feel that CWMs retain the positive attribute of PLAMs in reducing purchasing
power risk (see Leeds (1993)). They, however, improve upon PLAMs by reducing pre-
payment, default and interest rate risks, by the very nature of the contract where the bor-
rower shares in the risk of the housing market. This implies that borrowers participate in
1See Shiller (2003) for home equity insurance.
2Creation of new markets for large macroeconomic risks is discussed in Shiller (1993). For derivatives
markets for home prices see Shiller (2009a).
3the appreciation of the property during any positive economic event such as an interest
rate decrease, which mitigates prepayment risk. Borrowers, nonetheless, participate in
the depreciation of the property during any negative economic event, thereby reducing
default risk. This is because a CWM aims to keep the mortgage balance always lower
than or equal to the value of the property, thus keeping the embedded default option (at
or) out of the money at all times. Therefore, during the tenure of the mortgage which
is comprised of periods of varying economic cycles (including changing interest rates)
CWMs are anticipated to defy associated risks. The only risk which CWMs (like PLAMs)
currently cannot cure is liquidity risk. This, however, can be expected to alleviate over
time by their securitization and eventual deployment (in sufﬁcient volume).
We implicitly assume the existence of an information infrastructure, where property
rights, foreclosure procedures (needed for real estate to serve as collateral) and accurate
method of valuing property are well established (see Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000)).
We also draw parallels (or similarities) between CWMs and Shared Income Mortgages
(SIMs) discussed in Ebrahim, Shackleton and Wojakowski (2009). This helps us derive
closed form solutions to price variants of CWMs based on observable inputs of local
home prices. Finally, we provide examples, where exogenous variables governing CWMs
imputed from real world observations involving individual home prices, house price in-
dices, individual incomes, occupational income indicators, etc.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 1 initiates the pricing of CWM with a sim-
ple model involving an interest only contract. This is extended to the amortizing CWM
in Section 2 and to CWMs with protective threshold in Section 3. Finally, we provide
concluding comments in Section 6.
41 Interest-only Continuous Workout Mortgage
To begin, we provide a simple example where the payment of a CWM is continuously
readjusted based on the current house price index of a location. To simplify our setup we
focus on interest only mortgages with repayment maturity T. Property is acquired at time
t = 0 for initial cost H0. Subsequent values of the house are not observable until the time
of its sale. In lieu of this information a house price index of the area Ht is observed for all
times t ￿ 0. To make things even simpler we assume that: (i) the loan to value ratio is
100%; (ii) the constant, risk free market interest rate is r; and (iii) i is the mortgage rate. If
the mortgage were an “ordinary” interest only mortgage, the borrower would repay the
continuous interest ﬂow iH0dt plus a lump sum principal repayment H0 at maturity. The










+ e￿rTH0 . (1)
For an actuarially fair loan this present value should be equal to the initially borrowed







A continuous workout mortgage can be designed to protect the homeowner against falls
in the home value and the consequence of potential default. Starting backwards from
maturity T, implies the repayment H0 in this contract is replaced with
minfh0,hTg = h0 ￿ maxf0,h0 ￿ hTg = h0 ￿ (h0 ￿ hT)
+ . (3)
That is, the initial balance plus a short position in a put option on a house price index with
a strike price of h0 = H0. Similarly, for the interval 0 < t < T, the intermediate balance of
5the loan on which interest payments are based can be adjusted to
minfh0,htg = h0 ￿ maxf0,h0 ￿ htg = h0 ￿ (h0 ￿ ht)
+ , (4)
in lieu of H0. Substituting the above relationships the formula giving the expected present
value of the loan becomes
















The value V is an expected present value as ht and hT are random variables contingent
on a house price index. Expectations (E) are computed under risk-neutral measure with
discounting at the riskless rate. Risk neutral valuation is employed because the house
price index Ht is traded.
Note that V is less than V as the consumer obtains extra protection against price falls.
The last term is in fact a protective put issued at the money. With appropriate assumptions
regarding the dynamics of the house price index Ht, its value, p(h0,h0,T,r,d,s), can
be expressed using the Black-Scholes (1973) formula. Parameters d,s are, respectively,
the service ﬂow and volatility of the house price index (see Appendix A). Likewise, the
intermediate term is equal to the ratio of interest rates i/r times an integral of put options
written on a continuum of maturities from t = 0 to t = T. This integral is in fact a
ﬂoor issued at the money written on ﬂow rht. The value of this ﬂoor, P(rh0,rh0,T,r,d,s),
can also be computed analytically employing the closed form expressions developed in
Shackleton and Wojakowski (2007) (see Appendix A).
The goal is now to establish the actuarially fair mortgage rate i for this CWM. This
calculation is of utmost importance for prospective originators of continuous workouts.
While the mortgage balance adjusts systematically and automatically, the mortgage rate i
should be established only once as a part of the contract, remaining constant until matu-
























Solving (6) for i gives the mortgage interest rate.
Proposition 1 An interest-only Continuous Workout Mortgage (CWM) with protective put and







H0 (1￿ e￿rT) ￿ P(rH0,rH0,T,r,d,s)
#
. (8)
The above formula conﬁrms our intuition on the constitution of a continuous workout
mortgage. If both protective put (p) and ﬂoor (P) are deep out of the money (as can be
the case when house prices are expected to strongly appreciate), then p,P ! 0 and i ! r.
However, when this is not the case and the market anticipates a possibility of a price fall
(as can be the case following a bubble), both put and ﬂoor are in the money and i > r on
new deals. This implies that the market prices the insurance offered by the continuous
workout as an ex ante increase of the mortgage rate i.
PUT FIGURE 1 AND TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
Furthermore, the required interest i increases with risk s consistent with option pric-
ing theory. Interestingly, increasing risk even to s = 30% does not have a great impact on
i, as illustrated in Figure 1 and Table 1. For a typical loan with T = 30 years to maturity,
riskless rate r = 5% and a service ﬂow d = 1% the impact amounts to only an increase of
0.37% above 5%. Surprisingly, insuring the house price level is less costly as interest rates
become higher. However, such guarantees are more expensive when time to maturity is
short and when the service ﬂow is higher. The maturity effect is due to all options (i.e. the
7put and the ﬂoor) in this example being issued at-the-money, thereby insuring price lev-
els of the property at the time of issuance. More time to maturity implies that the house
has more chance to appreciate and the guarantee to depreciate. Likewise, the service
ﬂow effect is due to intensive property use and lower maintenance, which decreases its
value making guarantee more expensive. The d represents a service ﬂow to the occupier
that erodes capital gains in the home value H and therefore cannot be shared with the
lender. The higher the interest, the lower the impact of service ﬂow and thus the lower
the vulnerability to moral hazard.
Table 1 gives numerical values of annual payments when the risk free interest rate is
r = 5%. Interest-only continuous workouts are compared to the corresponding ﬁxed-rate
mortgages for different values of service ﬂow, d = 1% and d = 4%. Note that ﬁxed rate
(r = 5%) mortgage payments do not depend on the service ﬂow.
From an analytical perspective, equation (8) is equivalent to the riskless rate r times a
fraction. To facilitate this interpretation, we re-write it as
i = r
"






The numerator of the fraction represents the present value H0e￿rT of the forward sale
of the house at price H0, minus the initial value of the house H0, minus the cost of
the put protection p(H0, H0,T,r,d,s) to be paid through an increased mortgage interest
rate i. The denominator, meanwhile, represents intermediate period cash ﬂows where
interest payments accommodate the cost of insurance. It is equal to the value of the






, based again on the same continuous ﬂow rH0. Intuitively, this an-
nuity is still paid at rate r with the interest on difference r(H0 ￿ Ht) added back to
P(rH0,rH0,T,r,d,s) when Ht < H0.
From an economic perspective the above fraction is a ratio of two values, each corre-
sponding to a set of transactions. The ﬁrst set of transactions—collected in the numerator
8of (9)—occur at the beginning and at the end of the interval [0,T]. The appropriate mar-
ginal discount rate for this protected forward sale is r. By contrast, transactions within the
interval (0,T)—collected in the denominator of (9)—must earn the marginal rate i > r to
offset the added insurance.3 In equilibrium, both marginal costs must be equal yielding i.
Proposition 2 An interest-only Continuous Workout Mortgage (CWM) has mortgage interest i
and mortgage interest spread i￿r
r independent of initial property value H0 equal to
i = r
￿
1￿ e￿rT + p(1,1,T,r,d,s)








1￿ e￿rT ￿ P(r,r,T,r,d,s)
. (11)
Proof. Use (8) and the homogeneity properties for put and ﬂoor
p(aS,aK,T,r,d,s) = ap(S,K,T,r,d,s), P(as,ak,T,r,d,s) = aP(s,k,T,r,d,s) ,
(12)
where a is a constant, S,K are values [$] and s,k are ﬂows [$/yr.]. For a = H0 the initial
property value, H0, cancels out from the numerator and denominator of (8).
Property (10) is very useful as it allows quoting mortgage interest rate i to a (poten-
tial) borrower without knowing the value of the house to be purchased. This estimation is
based on the maturity of the loan, several market parameters and only needs the informa-
tion that the house value is determined at arms length. With the exception of the riskless
interest rate r, the parameters—such as the (average) service ﬂow (d) and the house price
volatility (s) of the locality—relate to the dynamics of the house price index and can be
estimated from data. Likewise, the second property (11) provides a useful estimation of
the mortgage spread.
3In the current CWM insurance is added against random decline of terminal property value HT as well
as against intermediate falls in property value Ht, t < T, that negatively impact on the value of interest
payments before maturity.
92 Repayment Continuous Workout Mortgage
A major innovation during years of Great Depression was fully amortizing mortgages
(see Green and Wachter (2005)). Their repayment ﬂow rate (R) is constant in time and












is equal to the present value of remaining payments and is essentially an accounting iden-




= rQt ￿ R (14)
(with terminal condition QT = 0). It implies a growth in the balance Qt at rate r offset by
progressive constant mortgage payment ﬂow R. The mortgage is fully repaid when the
interest ﬂow on principal rQt is lower than the coupon ﬂow R, in which case
R =
rQ0
1￿ e￿rT . (15)
A Repayment Continuous Workout Mortgage (RCWM) scales down the repayment
ﬂow R when the house price index of the location decreases. To emphasize that the repay-
ment ﬂow of a RCWM changes with time as a function of the initial home value weighted
by the local house price index we denote it as R(ht). Furthermore, for a full workout, we














where r is the maximal repayment ﬂow of a RCWM elaborated below.
This setup fully protects the homeowner against a decline in the value of property
because the repayment ﬂow R(ht) decreases whenever the house price index is below its
initial value. The repayment ﬂow attains its maximal value and becomes constant (equal
10to r, where r is a constant to be determined) whenever the house price index is above its
initial value. In this case repayments of a RCWM behave in the same way as repayments
of a standard fully amortizing mortgage. However, the maximal repayment ﬂow of a
RCWM (r) must be set at a level higher than the repayment ﬂow of a corresponding
standard fully amortizing mortgage. That is, r > R (see Proposition 4).
A partial workout will provide partial protection with the mortgage payment only
partly scaled down to

















where 0 ￿ a ￿ 1. Depending on the value of a, the repayment ﬂow can be adjusted
continuously between full protection (a = 1) and none at all (a = 0). For a = 0 the
repayment ﬂow becomes constant equal to r. In this particular case the RCWM reduces
to the well-known, classic case of fully amortizing repayment mortgage. The reduction of
mortgage payment Ra (ht) as a function of current adjusted house price level ht and for
different “workout proportions” (a) is illustrated in Figure 2.
PUT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
Note that due to the stochastic nature of the repayment ﬂow there is (in general) no
guarantee that the mortgage will be repaid in full. This is the case when the maturity
of the loan is kept ﬁxed and the values of a are strictly greater than zero. Indeed, in the
worst case scenario of ht suddenly dropping to zero repayments of a full workout (a = 1)
also drop to zero. Mortgage repayments (17) are random, contingent on future values of
the house price index. Fortunately, it is possible to accurately price this random stream of












































Clearly, the ﬁrst integral is given by (13) while the expectation in the second integral is




s=t with strike level rH0






















where p and P are the corresponding put and ﬂoor (see Appendix A). Combining the
above formulas we get the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 The mortgage balance of a Repayment Continuous Workout Mortgage (RCWM)














where H0 and Ht are values of the house price index at times of origination (t = 0) and the
semi-closed interval t 2 (0,T].
Clearly, for a = 0 we recover the full repayment case (13). Furthermore, with a > 0
and for the same r, the mortgage balance of a RCWM is lower. That does not mean,
however, that a full repayment mortgage and a RCWM both originating at the same time
t = 0 will have the same r. On the contrary, a RCWM has a higher mortgage payment ﬂow
r. The intuition is that for a given “workout proportion” a 2 [0,1], the mortgage payment
ﬂow r must be computed at origination to compensate for the guarantee against house
price decline provided by a RCWM.
12Proposition 4 For a given “workout proportion” a 2 [0,1], the mortgage payment ﬂow parame-
ter is given by
r =
rQ0
1￿ e￿rT ￿ a
H0P(rH0,rH0,T,r,d,s)
, (24)
where Q0 is the initial value of the loan.
Remark 5 The mortgage payment ﬂow r is a constant parameter which is computed at origina-
tion (t = 0) for the duration of the contract. It should not be confused with mortgage payment
Ra (ht) given by equation (17) which is a function of randomly changing adjusted house price
level ht. Mortgage payments Ra (ht) decrease when home prices decline.
Remark 6 For a = 0 the mortgage becomes a standard repayment type. Equation (24) yields
r = R in accordance with equation (15).
Equation(24)isofutmostimportanceforpotentialoriginatorsofcontinuousworkouts
with repayment features. This pricing condition helps us evaluate the maximal annual
payment for this mortgage. A broker can instantly compute this quantity on a computer
screen and make an offer to a customer. More importantly, different levels of protection
can be offered to different borrowers.
In fact all brokers in the world use a special version of this formula already. This is
becausefor a = 0equation(24)yieldsthevalueofmortgagepaymentfortheunprotected,
standard repayment mortgage, deﬁned by equation (15). Since P > 0 it is clear that the
protection commands a higher payment, as a > 0 implies r > R.
PUT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
For a 30-year repayment mortgage the continuous workout premium is not very large
making RCWMs very attractive. As summarized in Table 2, in a typical situation when
interests are 5% and volatility is 15%, the mortgage payment increases from $6.44 thou-
sand a year for a standard ﬁxed rate repayment mortgage, to $6.82 thousand a year for a
13corresponding full continuous workout. This is for an initial loan of $100 thousand and
when the service ﬂow rate is 1%. Therefore, the full protection costs only $383.41 a year,
i.e., it only adds about $31.95 to a monthly repayment of about $536.34.
PUT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE
From Figure 3 we also observe that the service ﬂow rate d does not inﬂuence the stan-
dard repayment level (no workout, a = 0, ﬂat dotted line). However, adding a con-
tinuous workouts (full a = 1 or partial a = 1
2) to a property with higher service ﬂow
(e.g. d = 1% or d = 4%) increases the monthly insurance premium only slightly. Lines for
partial protection (a = 1
2) lie only minimally below half-way between lines for a = 1 and
a = 0. For d = 4% and s = 30%, for example, the endpoint of the line for partial pro-
tection is located at 11.46, only slightly below the midpoint 11.55. For lower volatilities
the partial protection premium converges exactly to the midpoint, unless the service ﬂow
parameter d is larger than the riskless rate, in which case (not reported on Figure 3) this
line is “repelled” down from the midpoint, even for low volatilities.
PUT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE
Finally, it is interesting to note that the cost of protection—in terms of basis points that
are added to standard repayment by full protection—is higher at lower interest rates. See
Figure 4. This spread essentially mimics the behaviour of an at the money put option as
a function of the interest rate r.
Similarly, the evaluation of mortgage balances can be done using (23). This is a very
important information when the customer sells the house and prepays the mortgage. This
expression is also of practical importance for computation of annual mortgage statements
which are typically sent to customers at each year end.
143 Repayment CWM with Protective Threshold
A signiﬁcant increase in home prices leads to a considerable increase in mortgage pay-
ments. If such an increase is faster than the growth in household income, it leads to
a drain on discretionary income (see Wilcox (2009)). Wilcox (2009)—in a comment on
Shiller’s (2009b) paper—is of the view that households would still be willing to accept
this risk as they would be able to extract equity from their appreciating homes as discre-
tionary income. He, however, fails to observe that this risk would already be priced ex
ante by the calculation of an appropriate mortgage rate. The higher the risk assumed by
the household, the lower the mortgage rate would be.
There are, in fact, several ways to ﬁne-tune a CWM to make it less or more expensive.
One such tuning parameter is a for repayment CWM which speciﬁes the proportion of re-
sponse of mortgage balance. If the workout proportion a is set higher than 0 and closer
to 1, the household beneﬁts from a lower mortgage balance in poor states of the economy
but must assume a higher mortgage repayment ﬂow r parameter on a daily basis.4 Con-
versely, if the household sets a closer to 0 (corresponding to the case of ﬁxed rate standard
repayment mortgages) it sets a lower repayment ﬂow. This, however, leads to a higher
mortgage balance in poor states of the economy. Thus, by setting lower repayments, the
household bears a higher risk of negative equity during times of house price downturns.
A second way is to set a different protection threshold, higher or lower than the initial
house price index level H0. If, for example, we set a lower threshold K < H0, the protec-
tion kicks-in only after house values fall below K. For such a CWM the household then
repays

















4Recall that r deﬁnes the maximal annual repayment for a CWM i.e. the payment in good states of the





K < H0 . (26)
Note that in the special case when the strike price K equals H0 (or, equivalently, k = h0),
the repayment rate (25) reverts back to (17). A selectable protection threshold thus effec-
tively deﬁnes a new family of CW mortgages which we term as Threshold Repayment
Continuous Workout Mortgages. To use Figure 2 to illustrate (25) i.e. how the threshold
protection works, assume e.g. h0 = 120 and k = 100. Automatic workout will start when
ht falls below the threshold k = 100.
Proposition 7 The mortgage balance of a Threshold Repayment Continuous Workout Mortgage





















































































where p and P are the corresponding put and ﬂoor (see Appendix A). Substituting (32)
and (30) into (29) we derive (27).
Similarly, setting t = 0 and solving for r in (27) we derive the mortgage payment
parameter of a TRCWM.
Proposition 8 For a given “workout proportion” a 2 [0,1], the mortgage payment ﬂow of a
Threshold Repayment Continuous Workout Mortgage (TRCWM) is given by
r =
rH0





where H0 is the initial value of the loan, H0 is the initial value of the house price index and K is
the “protection threshold.”













Substituting Q0 = H0 and solving for r gives (33).
PUT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE
Figure 5 illustrates how a high threshold K commands a higher maximal repayment
r for the household to beneﬁt from higher reduction of mortgage balance Qt (scaled for
given r and r). The higher the threshold K, the earlier the workout kicks in, providing a
greater reduction of the mortgage balance in poor states of the economy. In the particular
case of no protection (K ! 0), a CWM reverts back to the standard repayment mortgage.
The mortgage payment r converges to a constant value equal to R given by (15).
174 Reﬁnancing and Prepayment of CWMs
Reﬁnancing constitutes a major risk faced by ﬁnancial institutions as it leads to termi-
nation of proﬁtable businesses at inopportune moments. Lenders also face prepayment
risk because they don’t know for how long a loan will be outstanding. Financial insti-
tutions can mitigate this risk by imposing a penalty to deter potentially mobile borrow-
ers or those who ﬂip property frequently. The penalty in this section is designed so as
to mimic those found in alternative mortgages like subprime (see Chomsisengphet and
Pennington-Cross (2006)) and is in the spirit of Stanton and Wallace (1998). It can be
evaluated using the methodology described below.
Empirical evidence conﬁrms that borrowers do not prepay optimally, i.e. they do not
maximize the loss to the lender. Reasons for prepaying typically include a sale of the
property due to: a) change of employment & relocations; b) change in family composition
(e.g. births, children leaving for university); c) a natural disaster, accident or default of the
borrower followed by insurance indemnity payment. These factors are relatively constant
in time and are often modelled in the mortgage industry using the constant Conditional
Prepayment Rate (CPR) convention or the Public Securities Association (PSA) benchmark
(see e.g. Fabozzi (2005)). These professional conventions do not explicitly model prepay-
ments due to reﬁnancings which typically occur at an increased rate during periods of
decreasing interest rates.
Prepayments can be modelled using a hazard rate (prepayment intensity) approach.
The random prepayment time tp is modelled as a Poisson process with intensity l and
is independent of state variables governing the processes for house prices. Formally, in-
formation in the model is described by enlarged ﬁltration G, generated by the Brownian
motion Zt and the prepayment indicator process 1ft￿tpg (see e.g. Bielecki and Rutkowski
(2002)).
Financial institutions typically impose a dollar prepayment penalty Ptp at reﬁnancing
18time tp. It is often a ﬁxed fraction a of the principal outstanding Qtp and is imposed if
reﬁnancing occurs before some lock-in date T￿




aQtp if tp < T￿
0 otherwise.
(35)
The prepayment penalty is attractive to only serious long term investors who like to
match the cost of ﬁnancing with the income and the growth in the value of the asset
instead of just their permanent income in case of alternative mortgages (see Hurst and
Stafford (2004); Doms and Krainer (2007)).
In practice, the contract is negotiated so that no prepayment occurs immediately. For
interest-only Continuous Workout Mortgages (see Section 1) the value of the mortgage at





























where the expectation is to be taken along the remaining house price risk dimension. In






is the cumulative probability of the loan surviving beyond time t and g(t) is the proba-




(1￿ F(t)) = le￿lt . (39)
19Deﬁning the adjusted principal of a CWM outstanding at time t 2 [0,T] as
Qt = minfh0,htg = h0 ￿ (h0 ￿ ht)
+ , (40)
we can also express the remaining components of (37):
￿ ct is the value of continuous payments received until prepayment date or maturity,
whichever comes ﬁrst
ct = iQt ; (41)
￿ St is the lump sum payment received if prepayment occurs before maturity, and is
equal to principal outstanding Qt plus applicable prepayment penalty Pt (if any);
St = Qt + Pt ; (42)
￿ ST is the lump sum payable at the tenure of the CWM (deﬁned in the indenture of
the contract) if prepayment did not occur, i.e. any capital outstanding
ST = QT . (43)
Note that (43) implies that if prepayment did not occur before maturity, the principal
must be repaid in full. The other important assumption is that the house price index of
the locality is used to estimate the automatic workout if prices depreciate. Alternatively,
the property can be re-appraised or a sale will reveal its value Htp if a prepayment occurs,
or HT at maturity.
As long as prepayment does not occur early (t < tp) the lender receives ct i.e., the
contractual interest ﬂow which automatically incorporates the continuous workout. Fur-
thermore, if prepayment does not occur before maturity (T < tp), the lender receives the
principal as a lump sum on maturity. Otherwise, if prepayment occurs at time tp 2 (0,T),
the interest ﬂow ceases immediately and the lender receives a lump sum corresponding
to the workout-adjusted principal payback and prepayment penalty (if any).





e￿(r+l)t (ct + lSt)dt + e￿(r+l)TST
￿
. (44)
Proposition 9 (CWM valuation equation) In an economic environment with prepayments,
the relationship linking contractual parameters (contract rate i and early prepayment penalty a)
of a Continuous Workout Mortgage to other exogenous parameters is given by







￿P((i + l) H0,(i + l) H0,T,r + l,d + l,s)
￿P(laH0,laH0,T￿,r + l,d + l,s)
￿p(H0, H0,T,r + l,d + l,s)
where T￿ is the last date the penalty (35) is chargeable, while P and p are closed-form expressions
for ﬂoor and at-the-money put given in Appendix A.




e￿(r+l)t [iQt + l(Qt + Pt)]dt + e￿(r+l)TQT
￿
. (46)




e￿(r+l)t [(i + l) Qt + laQt1t<T￿]dt + e￿(r+l)TQT
￿
. (47)
































= (i + l) H0
1￿ e￿(r+l)T
r + l
￿P((i + l) H0,(i + l) H0,T,r + l,d + l,s) ,
where P is given by the ﬂoor formula (see Appendix A). Similarly, the second expectation










￿P(laH0,laH0,T￿,r + l,d + l,s) .
The third expectation in (48) can be expressed using the Black-Scholes at the money put





= H0e￿(r+l)T ￿ p(H0, H0,T,r + l,d + l,s) . (51)
Replacing expectations (49), (50) and (51) in (48) and after some algebra then gives (45).
Remark 10 The value of the put in (45) can be expressed as the probability of the mortgage loan
surviving until maturity time T multiplied by an otherwise identical at-the-money European put
option on the property
p(H0, H0,r + l,d + l,s,T) = e￿lTp(H0, H0,r,d,s,T) . (52)


















where $ = r + l and f = d + l i.e. sums of ﬂoorlets on X struck at k over a continuum of
maturities t 2 [0,T]. In the last integral in (53) each ﬂoorlet is weighted by the probability
e￿lt that the loan will “survive” beyond t. This is because each (k ￿ Xt)
+ will be due only
22if the loan was not prepaid before t. These sums can be interpreted as weighted ﬂoors on
ﬂow Xt. In our setup ﬂows Xt are generated by prepaid “fractions” of the property value
lHt and laHt (see Remark that follows). Weighted ﬂoors can be computed thanks to
closed-form solution developed in Shackleton and Wojakowski (2007) (see Appendix A).
Remark 11 Flows in both expressions for ﬁnite ﬂoors P appearing in (45) are written on ﬂows
iHt + lHt and laHt. Flow iHt results from regular interest payment, while lHt and laHt
can be interpreted as effective ﬂows resulting from prepayments statistically occurring at rate l.
Initial values of these ﬂows enter the two ﬂoor functions P appearing in (45). A bank securitizing
CWMs after bundling them into portfolios will effectively be exposed to both ﬂows lHt and laHt.
The former ﬂow results from earlier principal repayments due to prepayments at rate l throughout
the lifetime [0,T] of the product. The latter ﬂow represents the supplementary principal fraction a
accruing at rate l during period [0,T￿] when early prepayment penalty is charged.
In order to eliminate arbitrage the value of the mortgage at origination, M0, must be
equal to the value of the loan outstanding, H0. Solving this condition, i.e. M0 = H0, where
M0 is given by (45) above, enables linking of the key parameters of the contract, such as
the contract rate i and the prepayment penalty a and express them as functions of market
data and other inputs (such as the prepayment rate l) and constraints. We will focus on
this problem in sections that follow.
Remark 12 When M0 = H0 and in absence of prepayment penalties (a = 0) the CWM valuation
equation gives
H0 (i ￿ r)
1￿ e￿(r+l)T
r + l
= P((i + l) H0,(i + l) H0,T,r + l,d + l,s) (54)
+p(H0, H0,T,r + l,d + l,s)
i.e. in absence of arbitrage the extra income generated by charging the customer the premium
i ￿ r > 0 must compensate the cost of continuous workout insurance expressed by the ﬂoor P
(intermediate, continuous workouts) and the put p (automatic workout at maturity).
235 Numerical Illustration
To illustrate CWM valuation in a world with prepayment risk, we focus on the case of a
CWM for which also a > 0 and T￿ > 0. This case is particularly important for residential
mortgages where early prepayment penalties are invariably imposed in practice. Note
that unlike the case without prepayment and in addition to terms expressing income from
early prepayment penalty, valuation now depends on the sum of ﬂoorlets weighted by
the probability of the mortgage “surviving” over the time period [0,T). This quantity is
analytically expressed by the ﬂoor function P((i + l) H0,(i + l) H0,T,r + l,d + l,s).
Some key parameters can be expressed explicitly. For example, given parameters such
as the prepayment rate l, prepayment penalty fraction a and lock-in time T￿ we can
explicitly compute the contract rate i as follows


















Pu,t = P(uH0,uH0,t,r + l,d + l,s) : u = l,r; t = T,T￿ (56)
and
p = p(rH0,rH0,T,r + l,d + l,s) . (57)
When l = 0 (no prepayment) and T￿ = 0 or a = 0 (no early prepayment penalty) we
recover the expression (8). Here too, it is readily seen that in fact H0 can be eliminated
from (55) to obtain expressions similar to (9) and (10). This means that there is no size
effect, i.e. the contract rate i is an intensive parameter, insensitive to the size of the loan
and thus to the size of the property.
Equation (55) implies that the contract rate i can be decreased by higher prepayment
penalties a. A further reduction in the contract rate i is achieved by extending the lock-
in period T￿ towards maturity T. This is, however, not immediate to be seen from (55).
24Therefore, to illustrate the sensitivity of the contract rate i to various inputs we present a
numerical example assuming the following case:
market interest rate r 10% p.a.
service ﬂow rate d 7.5% p.a.
house price volatility s 1%, 5% & 10% p.a.
term T 30 years
lock-in period T￿ 5 years
prepayment penalty a none & 5% of outstanding balance
We further assume that an individual, initially paying i = 10% per annum on a stan-
dard mortgage loan without prepayment penalties (base case) is offered to reﬁnance his
mortgage. A zero-proﬁt bank offers a set of alternative mortgages, with and without pre-
payment penalty. Figure 6 summarizes Continuous Workout Mortgage contracts offered
to this individual under different house price volatility market scenarios and as a function
of the prepayment rate l. It combines these two types of CWMs in three market scenarios
encompassing low and high volatilities.
INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE.
The adopted range of the prepayment rate l allows to do computations for different
types of individuals, according to how likely they are to prepay their mortgage. Our
range encompasses 50%, 100%, 200% and 400% multiples of the long-term standard PSA
value of 6% annual prepayment rate (l = 0.06). This results in values for l which are
0.03 (less likely to prepay than average), 0.06 (average), 0.12 (twice more likely to prepay
as average) and 0.24 (four times more likely to prepay compared to average).
When volatility is low (s = 1%) the probability of a continuous workout being trig-
gered is low. From Figure 6 it is clear that in this case the lender expects to make money
on customers prepaying early. These homeowners are charged the prepayment penalty.
25A zero-proﬁt bank will pass on this gain to customers by offering a lowered interest on
these CWM mortgages up front.
When volatility is moderate (s = 5%) the probability of continuous workout being
triggered increases. Figure 6 suggests that this will be reﬂected in the contract rate i of
the CWM which will have to be increased, even for customers not expected to prepay
(l = 0). However, the contract rate i can still be reduced by introducing a prepayment
penalty.
Higher volatilities (s = 10%) will mean yet more protection offered to customers but
at a higher cost reﬂected in further increases of the CWM contract rate i. Only for cus-
tomers with sufﬁciently high prepayment rate l the contract rate i can be reduced.
As intuitively expected, higher volatility and higher prepayment rates will typically
mean increased risks to the lender (workout risk, prepayment risk). This will result in
charging higher contract rate i up front. However, for realistic market parameter values,
increases of contract rate i are moderate rather than dramatic (e.g. increase by up to 0.1%
on average, when rates are in the range of 10%). Furthermore, these increases can be
further moderated by introducing early prepayment penalties, as is practiced for most
mortgage contracts. Figure 7 illustrates this point further by plotting combinations of
early prepayment parameters a and T￿ for different levels of prepayment intensity l, for
which the contract rate i of a Continuous Workout Mortgage remains “preserved” i.e.
equal to i = 10%.
INSERT FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE.
6 Concluding Remarks
The current crisis has increased the awareness of the susceptibility of the economy to
fragile plain vanilla mortgages. We argue that different variants of Continuous Work-
out Mortgages can be offered to homeowners as an ex ante solution to non-anticipated
26real estate price declines. “If workouts are part of the original mortgage contract, then
they can be done continually, systematically, and automatically, eliminating the delays,
irregularities and uncertainties that are seen with the workouts we have observed in the
subprime crisis. A great deal of human suffering at a time of economic contraction would
be eliminated.” (Shiller (2009b), Article 4, p. 11.)
This paper has attempted to mitigate this fragility by bringing into focus and formal-
izing the above intuition. CWMs are related to PLAMs (advocated by Franco Modigliani
for high inﬂation regimes) as pointed out by Shiller (2008b), (2008a) and (2009b). CWMs
share some positive attributes with PLAMs (such as purchasing power risk) and mitigate
other negative attributes (such as default risk, interest rate risk and prepayment risk).
The only residual risk attributed to CWMs is liquidity risk. It too can be alleviated by
employing it in sufﬁcient amount to warrant its securitization.
We model a variety of Continuous Workout Mortgages (CWMs), including interest-
only and repayment contracts. For repayment CWMs we extend our analysis to include
two negotiable parameters: adjustable “workout proportion” a and adjustable “protec-
tion threshold” K. The “workout proportion” a enables the workout protection to change
the proportion while the “protection threshold” K can be set so as the workout starts (and
stops) working below (above) a speciﬁc level.
An interest-only CWM protects both (a) interest payments and (b) terminal repayment
against declines of property value. The insurance for this is paid for via interest i which
is increased above r (the riskless rate in our examples).
A repayment CWM protects against declines in property value. As there is no termi-
nal repayment, this mortgage protects intermediate repayments Ra (ht), which decrease
as house price decreases. The premium of this insurance is incorporated into higher max-
imal repayment ﬂow parameter r, established ex ante. Furthermore, a repayment mort-
gage, andthusacontinuousworkoutrepaymentmortgage, hastheadvantageofreducing
moral hazard. This is due to the earlier repayment of the loan’s principal.
27The main contributions of this paper thus are: (a) simple modelling of variants of
CWMs; (b) closed form formulae for key parameters of CWMs. For repayment contracts,
we provide closed form expressions for mortgage balances and payments. For interest-
only CWMs, we provide closed form expressions for mortgage interest. These formulae
are of utmost importance for potential originators of CWMs. Our results help in the
understanding the mechanics of CWMs and estimation of key contract parameters for
providing the protection level to borrowers in the form of protection threshold. Thus,
employment of CWMs should be recommended to improve the resilience of the ﬁnancial
system, mitigate systemic risk and enhance the quality of life of agents in the economy.
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31A Appendix: Floor and Put Formulae
Floors P on ﬂow s with strike ﬂow level k for ﬁnite horizon T can be computed using the







































































whereas the cumulative normal integrals N (￿) are labelled with parameters db
db =
lns0 ￿ lnk +
￿












(different to the standard textbook notation) for elasticity b which takes one of four values
b 2 fa,b,0,1g.
Standard Black-Scholes (1973) put on S with strike value of K can be computed using
p(S0,K,T,r,d,s) = Ke￿rTN (￿d0) ￿ S0e￿dTN (￿d1) (63)
where d0 and d1 can be computed using formula (62) in which values S0 and K can (for-
mally) be used in place of ﬂows s0 and k.
Both ﬂoor (58) and put (63) formulae assume that the underlying ﬂow s or asset S






= (r ￿ d)dt + sdZt (64)
with initial values s0 and S0, respectively. Clearly, (64) describes a geometric Brownian
motion under risk-neutral measure where Zt is the standard Brownian motion, s is the
volatility, r is the riskless rate and d is the service ﬂow. We assume that (64) describes
the dynamics of the repayment ﬂow s. Similarly, (64) also deﬁnes the dynamics of the
value S of the real estate property. Alternatively, the model could be speciﬁed under the
actual probability measure, extending Shiller and Weiss (1999) to allow for computation
of ﬂoors, for example along the lines of Shackleton and Wojakowski (2007).
33B Tables
Volatility s Interest-only mortgage payments Repayment mortgage payments
Standard CWM Standard CWM
r = const. i > r r = R (a = 0) r > R (a = 1)
(d = 1%) (d = 4%) (d = 1%) (d = 4%)
0.025 5. 5. 5.02 6.44 6.44 6.46
0.05 5. 5.01 5.15 6.44 6.45 6.59
0.075 5. 5.03 5.36 6.44 6.48 6.78
0.1 5. 5.1 5.62 6.44 6.55 7.
0.125 5. 5.21 5.9 6.44 6.67 7.24
0.15 5. 5.37 6.2 6.44 6.82 7.5
0.175 5. 5.57 6.53 6.44 7.01 7.78
0.2 5. 5.82 6.87 6.44 7.23 8.08
0.225 5. 6.1 7.24 6.44 7.47 8.4
0.25 5. 6.41 7.63 6.44 7.75 8.74
0.275 5. 6.76 8.04 6.44 8.05 9.1
0.3 5. 7.13 8.47 6.44 8.37 9.48
0.325 5. 7.53 8.93 6.44 8.72 9.88
0.35 5. 7.96 9.41 6.44 9.09 10.3
0.375 5. 8.42 9.91 6.44 9.49 10.8
0.4 5. 8.91 10.4 6.44 9.92 11.2
0.425 5. 9.42 11. 6.44 10.4 11.7
0.45 5. 9.96 11.6 6.44 10.9 12.3
0.475 5. 10.5 12.2 6.44 11.4 12.8
0.5 5. 11.1 12.8 6.44 11.9 13.4
Table 1: Annual payments when the current interest rate is r = 5%. Interest-only and
repayment continuous workouts compared to the corresponding ﬁxed-rate (interest-only
and repayment) mortgages for different values of service ﬂow d = 1% and d = 4%.
Fixed rate (r = 5%) mortgage payments do not depend on the service ﬂow d. Initial loan
balance, Q0, is normalized to $100 thousand.
34Volatility s Interest-only mortgage payments Repayment mortgage payments
Standard CWM Standard CWM
r = const. i > r r = R (a = 0) r > R (a = 1)
(d = 1%) (d = 4%) (d = 1%) (d = 4%)
0.025 10. 10. 10. 10.52 10.52 10.52
0.05 10. 10. 10.01 10.52 10.53 10.53
0.075 10. 10.01 10.03 10.52 10.54 10.56
0.1 10. 10.03 10.09 10.52 10.56 10.62
0.125 10. 10.07 10.18 10.52 10.6 10.72
0.15 10. 10.14 10.33 10.52 10.67 10.86
0.175 10. 10.24 10.52 10.52 10.78 11.06
0.2 10. 10.38 10.76 10.52 10.92 11.29
0.225 10. 10.55 11.03 10.52 11.09 11.56
0.25 10. 10.77 11.35 10.52 11.31 11.87
0.275 10. 11.03 11.71 10.52 11.56 12.21
0.3 10. 11.32 12.1 10.52 11.85 12.58
0.325 10. 11.66 12.52 10.52 12.18 12.98
0.35 10. 12.03 12.97 10.52 12.53 13.42
0.375 10. 12.44 13.45 10.52 12.93 13.88
0.4 10. 12.88 13.97 10.52 13.35 14.37
0.425 10. 13.36 14.51 10.52 13.81 14.89
0.45 10. 13.87 15.08 10.52 14.3 15.44
0.475 10. 14.42 15.69 10.52 14.82 16.01
0.5 10. 15. 16.32 10.52 15.37 16.62
Table 2: Annual payments when the current interest rate is r = 10%. Interest-only and
repayment continuous workouts compared to the corresponding ﬁxed-rate (interest-only
and repayment) mortgages for different values of service ﬂow d = 1% and d = 4%. Fixed
rate (r = 10%) mortgage payments do not depend on the service ﬂow d. Initial loan
balance, Q0, is normalized to $100 thousand.
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Figure 1: Interest-only Continuous Workout Mortgage. Required interest i as a function
of risk s. Tenure is T = 30 years or T = 1 years to maturity, riskless rates are r = 5% and
r = 15% and service ﬂow rate is either d = 1% (thick lines) or 4% (dashed lines).
















Figure 2: Repayment Continuous Workout Mortgage (with Threshold). Reduction of
mortgage payment Ra (ht) as a function of current adjusted house price level ht and dif-
ferent “workout proportions” a. Full workout is a = 100% (thick solid line), no workout
(standard repayment mortgage, thin dashed line) is a = 0. Maximal annual repayment
(mortgage repayment parameter) is normalized to one i.e. r = 1 and h0 = k = 100. To
illustrate the “threshold” variant of workouts assume k = 100 and a higher starting price
level e.g. h0 = 120.












Figure 3: Repayment Continuous Workout Mortgage. Mortgage payment r as a function
of risk s. Partial workout (a = 1
2) is positioned between full workout (a = 1, thick lines)
and standard repayment (no workout, a = 0, dotted ﬂat line). Tenure is T = 30 years
to maturity, riskless rate is r = 10%. Service ﬂow rates are d = 1% (solid lines) or 4%
(dashed lines).


















Figure 4: Repayment Continuous Workout Mortgage. Mortgage payment spread ra ￿
rH0 (1￿ exp(￿rT))
￿1 as a function of interest rate r for full workout (a = 1). Tenure is
T = 30 years to maturity, service ﬂow rates are d = 1% (dashed line), 4% (solid line) and
8% (bold line). H0, is normalized to $100 thousand.


































Figure 5: Threshold Repayment Continuous Workout Mortgage (TRCWM) with thresh-
old parameter K. Increase in the mortgage payment ﬂow r (above) compared to reduction
of mortgage balance rQt/r (below), as a function of “workout threshold” K. Interest rate
r = 5% and 10%, service ﬂow rate d = 1% and 4%, volatility s = 15%, term T = 30 years
to repayment, initial house price and index H0 = 100.









Figure 6: Continuous Workout Mortgage contract rate i as a function of the prepayment
rate l.










Figure 7: Continuous Workout Mortgage contract-rate-preserving combinations (at
i = 10%) of early prepayment parameters a and T￿ for diffrerent levels of prepayment
intensity l.
40